Cybersecurity Blog | RedLegg

Special Intelligence Bulletin: ARTEX and AI-Driven Attack Tools

Written by RedLegg's Cyber Threat Intelligence Team | 11/20/26, 9:31 PM

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On November 13 the FBI issued a warning about ARTEX, a free tool that uses artificial intelligence to carry out most of a cyberattack on its own. It was built for authorized security testing, but criminal groups have been using it since at least August. If you've seen the coverage and are wondering what it means for your organization, this bulletin explains what ARTEX does, what RedLegg is doing for our customers, and steps any organization can take now.

RedLegg will occasionally communicate vulnerabilities released outside the usual release schedule to provide additional value to our customers. These emergency bulletins describe vulnerabilities or threats we classify as the highest severity level and warrant out-of-band emergency patching or mitigation action.

ARTEX and AI-Driven Attack Tools

On November 13 the FBI issued a warning about ARTEX, a free tool that uses artificial intelligence to carry out most of a cyberattack on its own. It was built for authorized security testing, but criminal groups have been using it since at least August. If you've seen the coverage and are wondering what it means for your organization, this bulletin explains what ARTEX does, what RedLegg is doing for our customers, and steps any organization can take now. 

What ARTEX does

ARTEX can find a target, break in and steal data with very little human involvement. In some cases the FBI saw attackers go from first contact to high-level access in under three hours. The original developer took the tool offline in October, but copies and a paid version called ARTEX PRO are still circulating. Researchers found more than 1,600 ARTEX control panels exposed on the internet in early November.

The tool tends to go after systems that get less attention, such as partner and supplier portals, mobile app back ends, employee-facing applications, older systems and connections to outside vendors. It makes a lot of noise, which helps defenders spot it. It also moves fast enough that the window between the first warning sign and real damage can be short. The FBI has seen attacks in financial services, government, healthcare, manufacturing, energy, legal, technology and other sectors, so any organization with internet-facing systems should treat this as relevant.

ARTEX is not the only one

ARTEX is getting the headlines, but it is one of several similar tools. Google's threat intelligence team has also seen tools called Cairn and PentAGI used in real attacks. They work the same way, using AI to chain attack steps together quickly and with little human direction.

We expect tools like these to become more common and more capable over the coming months. The good news is that the defense does not change from one tool to the next. They all go after the same weak spots and leave the same kinds of traces, so the monitoring and steps described in this bulletin apply to all of them.

What RedLegg is doing for MDR customers

Our Cyberfusion team monitors your environment 24 hours a day. The early activity these tools generate is the kind our detections are already built to catch. Because of how quickly they move, our analysts are giving the following alerts higher priority:

  • Scanning of your internet-facing systems, and serious threats flagged but not blocked by Palo Alto Networks firewalls
  • Web application attacks, including SQL injection, cross-site scripting and directory traversal, along with repeated or varied attacks from the same source
  • Brute-force attempts against logins and passwords

Our threat intelligence process also checks newly published indicators against both current and historical activity. If indicators from the FBI report show up in your environment, past or present, we will investigate and contact you.

For customers with a supported EDR platform connected to our service, our analysts can isolate an endpoint directly when the EDR detects malicious activity on it. This cuts off the attacker's ability to move further while we notify you. An analyst takes that action after validating the threat. It does not happen automatically.

How RedLegg customers can help

Speed matters more than usual with these tools, and a few things on your side make a real difference.

  1. Respond quickly to our escalations, especially any involving the alerts above. An attack that can reach high-level access in hours leaves little room for delay.
  2. Confirm your escalation contacts are current, including after-hours contacts.
  3. Review what we're authorized to do on your behalf. During onboarding we agreed on which actions our analysts can take for high-confidence threats and which need your approval first. Given how fast these tools work, it's worth confirming those boundaries still fit. Your Service Delivery Manager can walk through this with you.
  4. Tell us about internet-facing systems we can't see. We can only detect activity on systems that send logs to us. If you have partner portals, mobile app back ends or older systems that aren't onboarded, let us know and we'll help you prioritize them.

Recommended hardening steps for all organizations

The following steps come from the FBI's recommendations.

Reduce your exposure

  • Keep an inventory of every system reachable from the internet, including the less obvious ones listed above.
  • Limit administrative and management access to trusted networks.

Protect your applications

  • Rate-limit requests to your applications, and alert on traffic that arrives unusually fast or in a pattern.
  • Don't show technical error details to people who aren't logged in.
  • Check application settings and code for stored passwords or access keys, and change any that are exposed.

Harden identity and access

Several of the attacks the FBI describes worked by abusing application permissions and service accounts rather than user logins, so this area deserves attention.

  • Give people and applications only the access they need. Pay particular attention to applications with broad permissions and to the consents users have granted to third-party applications.
  • Watch for new passwords, keys or certificates being added to applications, new privileged role assignments, and unusual activity by applications acting on their own.
  • Review successful and failed sign-ins by service accounts separately. Look into any that come from unfamiliar sources, not only the addresses listed in the FBI report.
  • If you use Microsoft Entra, check audit records for new applications or owners, new consent grants, privileged role changes, and changes to users, groups, sign-in methods or Conditional Access policies.- Require approval for higher-risk certificate requests, and watch for unusual certificate enrollment involving privileged users.- If you find something suspicious, preserve the evidence first, then remove the unauthorized access and change the affected credentials.

ConnectWise Cloud Backup users: One ARTEX campaign compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup and led to sign-in attempts against more than 2,250 downstream Microsoft 365 tenants. If you use or have used it, review every tenant where its applications were authorized, even if you no longer use the integration, and search by application ID rather than display name. Keep those connections disabled until ConnectWise provides restoration instructions, and don't delete the applications as a first step, since that destroys evidence.

If you suspect an attack

RedLegg customers should contact us right away at support@redlegg.com or (877) 811-5040.

For any organization, save your logs before making changes, but don't wait on log exports before acting to contain the problem. Report suspicious activity to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center at [www.ic3.gov](https://www.ic3.gov) or to your local FBI field office.

The FBI report lists technical indicators such as known malicious IP addresses. The FBI advises checking these carefully before blocking anything, because the addresses may later be used by someone else.

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